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We interpret the problem of updating beliefs as a choice problem (selecting a pos-
terior from a set of admissible posteriors) with a reference point (prior). We use AGM
belief revision to deﬁne the support of admissible posteriors after arrival of informa-
tion, which applies also to zero probability events. We study two classes of updating
rules for probabilities : 1) ”lexicographic” updating rules where posteriors are given
by a lexicographic probability system 2) ”minimum distance” updating rules which
select the posterior closest to the prior by some metric. We show that an updating
rule is lexicographic if and only if it is Bayesian, AGM-consistent and satisﬁes a weak
form of path independence. While not all lexicographic updating rules have a mini-
mum distance representation, we study a sub-class of lexicographic rules, which we call
”support-dependent” rules, which admit a minimum distance representation. Finally,
we apply our approach to the problem of updating preferences.
Keywords : Bayesian Updating, AGM Belief Revision, Information Processing, Lexi-
cographic Updating
JEL : D01, D80, D81, D83
1 Introduction
Updating beliefs in light of newly acquired information is a problem that is relevant and
occurs in many situations in economic theory. In most environments, an agent’s belief is
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represented by a probability measure over a state space, elements of which are payoﬀ rel-
evant. As a result, actions of the agent depend crucially on his opinion or belief over the
state variable and consequently also on how he chooses to update his belief upon learning
an event. A dominant principle used to update probabilities in most models is Bayesian
updating. Starting with a prior π and observing a positive probability event A, Bayesian
updating suggests the posterior π′(E) = π(E ∩ A)/π(A). However, in the event of a sur-
prise i.e. observing a zero probability event, Bayesian updating remains silent and is not
well-deﬁned. Such situations arise in extensive-form games of imperfect information where
a player’s strategy must specify which action to choose in an information set that is reached
with zero probability and the updating problem is one of assigning probabilities to nodes
in the information set. The solution concepts of sequential equilibrium and trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium (see Kreps and Wilson [1982b] and Selten [1975]) both place restrictions
on admissible beliefs on information sets which lie oﬀ path (using Bayesian updating other-
wise). These put restrictions on oﬀ-path beliefs by requiring them to be the limit of on-path
beliefs corresponding to a sequence of perturbations of the equilibrium strategy proﬁle. In
perfect information extensive-form games as well, due to strategic uncertainty, a player may
revise their beliefs after observing a deviation, about their opponent’s strategies and hence,
their future actions (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi [2002]). Abstracting away from the game-
theoretic scenario, we ask whether in the probabilistic model itself, there exists a systematic
way to extend Bayesian updating to zero probability events.
In this paper, we interpret the updating problem as a choice problem with a reference point
(see Rubinstein and Zhou [1999])). The reference point here is a prior π on the state space
and given an event E, the choice problem is one of choosing a posterior from an admissible
set of posteriors which have a common support in E. This raises the question of the how the
admissible set of posteriors should be selected for a given updating problem (π,E). Since we
wish to extend Bayesian updating, if π(E) > 0 we would want this set to be all probability
measures whose support is the intersection of the support of the prior and the observed pos-
itive probability event and choice would be the Bayesian posterior. The intersection would
include all states consistent both with the information E and the prior belief π. But what
happens if E has zero probability? Is there a consistent way to select the set of admissible
posteriors for all events E? This would allow us to deﬁne the support of the posterior belief
after both positive and zero probability events.
The question of ﬁnding the support of the posterior can be posed as a problem of ”the-
ory change” as is known in the non-probabilistic theory of belief revision from propositional
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logic, namely, AGM belief revision (see Alchourron et al. [1985]). In that setting, an agent’s
primitive is a belief set, which is a set of propositions or events that the agent believes to
be true (in the present context this would be all probability one events according to the
prior). The belief revision problem is one of revising the belief set to a new belief set, based
on the information that event E has occured. The desirable feature of applying the AGM
procedure is that it provides solutions to the belief revision problem even when information
obtained is inconsistent with prior beliefs. This property of the theory is, as we shall see,
intimately linked with the problem of updating over zero probability events. If the prior is
π and K(π) is its associated belief set, then we want the posterior belief π′ to be such that
the now revised belief set, K(π′), is derived from K(π) and E via AGM belief revision.
The consistency requirement here means that we want the solution to our probabilistic
updating problem to be consistent with the underlying change in the associated belief sets.
If we believe that this latter change should satisfy certain postulates and properties (which
is a central concern of the literature on belief revision , see Costa and Pedersen [2011]), then
we obtain a set of restrictions on the posteriors to be considered admissible. The advantage
of this approach is that it is well deﬁned in specifying the support of posteriors after all
events, including zero-probability events. It also has the desirable property that all admis-
sible posteriors have common support in the event observed and hence, updating satisﬁes
consequentialism. When an updating rule abides by the AGM procedure, we say that it is
AGM-consistent.
We focus on two classes of updating rules. The ﬁrst class of updating rules we study are
lexicographic updating rules where the posteriors are deﬁned by a lexicographic probability
system (see Blume et al. [1991a], Halpern [2010] and Hammond [1994]). We show that an
updating rule is lexicographic if and only if it is Bayesian, AGM-consistent and satisﬁes a
weak form of path independence (order in which information arrives does not matter). The
weakening is in the sense that order independence is satisﬁed only for certain pairs of events.
It also turns out that this weakening is crucial. There exist no updating rules which are
Bayesian and satisfy strong path independence (order-independence on all consistent pairs
of events). Extending this approach to the problem of updating preferences, we also obtain
a similar characterisation of lexicographic updating in that setting.
The second class of updating rules, which we call minimum-distance, picks the posterior
closest to the prior according to a metric deﬁned on the space of probability measures1. We
1Similar rules have also been studied by Perea [2009] and Rubinstein and Zhou [1999].
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study the relationship between lexicographic and minimum distance updating rules. While
not all lexicographic updating rules have a minimum distance representation, we show that
a sub-class of lexicographic rules, which we call support-dependent updating rules, indeed
admit minimum distance representations. In these rules, the alternative hypotheses that
are used to update over events of zero probability, depend only on the support of the prior.
Hence, they depend only on the set of states which have ex-ante zero probability.
For an exposition of AGM theory, Costa and Pedersen [2011]) and Huber [2013]) provide
excellent surveys. The problem of choosing supports of posteriors in a manner consistent
with AGM belief revision has been studied by Bonanno [2009]), where a choice correspon-
dence given an event, chooses as a subset of the event, the support of the posterior. The
framework is non-probabilistic and it is shown that rationalisability of the choice correspon-
dence is equivalent to AGM-consistency. In the present framework, we derive a counterpart
of this result and it provides a very useful characterisation of AGM-consistency of an updat-
ing rule (see also Grove [1988]). The relationship between lexicographic probability systems
and AGM consistency has also been discussed in Shoham and Leyton-Brown [2009]) in terms
of the belief operator for revising belief sets, again, in a non-probabilistic framework. We
derive and build on that observation in our framework and also establish a complete char-
acterisation of lexicographic updating rules.
In the theory of decision under uncertainty, in addition to Blume et al. [1991a]), who con-
sider lexicographic probabilities, there has a been some attention devoted to alternative
approaches to dealing with zero probability events. Myerson [1986]) provides axiomatic
foundations for conditional probability systems. Ortoleva [2012] studies an alternative ap-
proach where once a zero probability occurs, the agent uses a belief over beliefs and the
maximum likelihood rule to obtain posteriors. In the present work, such updating rules may
violate AGM consistency, which is central to the analysis considered here. Karni and Vierø
[2013] study a framework where the set of states itself can expand due to growing awareness
and they consider the phenomenon of reverse Bayesianism. This requires that whenever the
state space grows and the support of the prior belief is contained in that of the posterior,
the prior can be obtained by applying Bayes rules to the posterior. The issue of updating
ambiguous beliefs as deﬁned in Schmeidler [1989] and Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989] has been
discussed in Gilboa and Schmeidler [1993]. They consider the problem of updating convex
non-additive probabilities and establish the equivalence of the dempster-shafer rule for con-
ditioning and maximum likelihood updating. Though in the present work we do not discuss
ambiguous beliefs, our approach may be used to deﬁne updating rules for it. This extension
4
could potentially provide us with a connection between ambiguity aversion and agents’ at-
titudes to zero probability events. Finally, our extension involving updating preferences is
also related to the above papers and Hanany and Klibanoﬀ [2007], who study updating rules
for preferences with multiple priors.
The outline of this paper is as follows : In section 2, we introduce the framework and
provide a brief summary of AGM belief revision. In section 3, we study lexicographic updat-
ing rules and minimum distance updating rules are studied in Section 4. Finally, we study
preference updating in Section 5. Some proofs are in the appendix.
2 Framework
2.1 Updating Rules
In this section, we describe the environment and introduce the updating problem faced by
the agent. We denote as Ω, a non-empty ﬁnite set, to be the underlying state space on which
the agent has beliefs. An agent’s probabilistic belief about the state space is deﬁned by a
probability measure π ∈ Δ(Ω). We shall sometimes call π, the agent’s prior to emphasise
that π is his belief prior to arrival of information. Similarly, we shall refer to a belief π′ as
the agent’s posterior when it is formed after information arrives. Throughout the paper, we
shall denote as supp(π) := {ω ∈ Ω : π(ω) > 0}, the support of a probability measure π.
Upon learning that an event A ⊆ Ω has taken place, the agent updates his prior belief π over
the state space Ω to a posterior belief π′ ∈ Δ(Ω). The agent performs this task in two stages.
Upon observing A, he lists a menu of possible posteriors Π(π,A) ⊆ Δ(Ω) to choose from.
From the menu, he selects a single posterior π′ ∈ Π(π,A). This two-stage choice completely
describes his belief updating procedure and we deﬁne it formally below.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An updating rule is a tuple < c,Π > where c : Δ(Ω)× 2Ω\{∅} → Δ(Ω) and
Π : Δ(Ω)× 2Ω → 2Δ(Ω) such that :
• For all π′, π′′ ∈ Π(π,A) : supp(π′) = supp(π′′) ⊆ A.
• c(π,A) ∈ Π(π,A).
The ﬁrst condition says that the menu of posteriors selected by the agent has a common
support that is contained completely in the event learned A. The common support assump-
tion stems from the rationale that the set of states the agent cannot disregard must be
independent of the choice of the posterior and depends solely on (π,A), otherwise additional
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information must have inﬂuenced him to do so. Inclusion of the support in A captures the
idea that the event A has been observed to have taken place and the agent disregards as
improbable, states outside it. This latter condition may be viewed as updating satisfying
consequentialism. In what follows, we shall sometimes write suppΠ(π,A) to denote the com-
mon support of the probability measures in Π(π,A).
Note that an updating rule has two components : c and Π. One may view Π as capturing the
”qualitative” aspect of the updating process. This corresponds to identifying the support
of the posterior distribution. The function c captures the ”quantitative” part, in the sense
that c(π,A) tells us the precise numerical values for the posterior probabillities supported on
suppΠ(π,A). This decomposition of the updating process seems natural particularly when
dealing with zero probability events. An agent may update beliefs by ﬁrst determining which
states to place positive weight on and then choosing the exact distribution of probabilities.
For example, in the context of games, an updating rule may be applied as follows. After
a deviation occurs, Π tells us a player’s revised belief about the set of strategies that the
opponent could be playing with positive probability. Then, c assigns weights to this set of
probable strategies.
2.2 Bayesian Updating
We now discuss updating rules deﬁned by Bayesian updating. Such updating rules apply
Bayes’ rule when positive probability events are observed. The support of the posterior then
equals the intersection of the support of the prior and the event observed.
Deﬁnition 2.2. An updating rule < c,Π > is said to be Bayesian if :
• Whenever π(A) > 0, Π(π,A) = {π′ : supp(π′) = supp(π) ∩ A}.
• Morever, when π(A) > 0, c(π,A)(ω) = π({ω}∩A)
π(A)
.
Notice in the above deﬁnition, no restriction has been placed on how the updating rule
behaves on zero probability events. Additionally, in this case, we make no restrictions on
the common support of the menu of posteriors chosen by the individual. This makes the
class of Bayesian updating rules very large and potentially allows for varied attitudes in
updating when agents are completely surprised. Restrictions on c(π,A) and Π(π,A) when
π(A) = 0 can potentially have very strong implications and is indeed the main subject of the
remainder of the paper. We impose consistency requirements on updating rules to restrict
behaviour on zero probability events. One would hope for such additional requirements
to not be dictated by arbitrary exogenous rules but arise from the primitives (π,A) in a
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manner that is plausible. In doing so, we impose that the updating rule be consistent with
a belief revision procedure proposed by Alchourron et al. [1985] (henceforth AGM), that
widely arises in propositional logic in the context of updating sets of propositions (”belief
sets” in the parlance of the belief revision literature). We introduce a notion called AGM-
consistency for updating rules based on this requirement. The next section is devoted to its
formulation and interpretation in the present environment.
2.3 AGM Consistency
In this section, we introduce a notion of consistency of updating rules based on AGM belief
revision. We will ﬁrst provide some deﬁnitions and then describe the revision procedure. It
shall be useful to interpret subsets of the state space Ω as an algebra of propositions with
an event E being treated as a proposition. The set of all propositions is thus 2Ω2. In this
context, the notion of logical consequence may be deﬁned as follows :
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let G ⊆ 2Ω and let A ⊆ Ω. We say G  A (meaning A is a logical
consequence of G) if
⋂
G∈G
G ⊆ A and deﬁne the consequence operator as Cn(G) = {A : G  A}.




Let us consider the following example.




E = {x, y} and {x, y} and {x, y, z} are the only sets which contain the
intersection. Now, consider G ′ = {{x}, {x, y}, {x, y, z}}. This is not logically closed. The
set {x, z} is not in G ′ however
⋂
E∈G′
E = {x} ⊆ {x, z}. Note also that both G and G ′ are
consistent.
Let us discuss the notion of logical consequence deﬁned above. A set A is said to be a
logical consequence of G if it impossible that all events in G occur but A does not occur i.e
there does not exist any state ω such that ω ∈
⋂
G∈G
G but ω /∈ A. This is a deﬁnition which
is natural and analogous to the deﬁnition of logical consequence in propositional logic if we
2Consider, for example, tossing a coin one hundred times. The state space would be the set {H,T}100.
Now, the propositions ”the 24th coin toss led to Heads” and ”the 26th coin toss led to tails” can both
be expressed as events {ω|ω24 = H} and {ω|ω26 = T}. The conjunction of the two propositions would
correspond to the intersection of the two events.
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were to interpret the set of all truth valuations as the state space Ω3. In the remainder of
the paper, a logically closed and consistent set of events will often be referred to as a theory
or belief set and will be denoted as K. Corresponding to each π ∈ Δ(Ω), we can deﬁne a
belief set consisting of all the probability one events.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Let Ω be ﬁnite and let π ∈ Δ(Ω). The belief set corresponding to π is
deﬁned as the set K(π) = {E ⊆ Ω : π(E) = 1}
It follows that K(π) is logically closed and consistent. Clearly,
⋂
E∈K(π)
E = supp(π). The
set K(π) is logically closed since all probability one events contain the support supp(π). In
fact, K(π) contains exactly the probability one events. Consistency of K(π) follows from the
fact that the support is non-empty. Consider the example below.
Example 2.2. Suppose Ω = {x, y, z} and π = (λ, 1− λ, 0) ∈ Δ(Ω) where λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
K(π) = {{x, y}, {x, y, z}} and from Example 2.1, it follows that K(π) is logically closed and
consistent.
2.3.1 AGM Postulates
The theory of belief revision (see Costa and Pedersen [2011] and Huber [2013] for introduc-
tory surveys) is devoted to studying the revision of belief sets K upon learning a new event
A by means of revision operator ∗. Formally, letting T denote the set of all logically closed
and consistent belief sets, a revision operator is a function ∗ : T × 2Ω\{∅} → 22Ω . Hence,
revision of the belief set K leads to the new belief set K ∗A. AGM study revision operators
∗ that satisfy the following postulates :
1. (Closure) K ∗ A = Cn(K ∗ A).
2. (Success) A ∈ K ∗ A.
3. (Inclusion) K ∗ A ⊆ Cn(K ∪ {A}).
4. (Vacuity) If Ac /∈ K, then Cn(K ∪ {A}) ⊆ K ∗ A.
5. (Consistency) If A 	= ∅, then K ∗ A is consistent.
3See, for example, Chapter 2 of Gallier [2015]. For a set of atomic propositions, P, the state space
would be all truth valuations {T, F}P. Each proposition α derived from P through elementary operations
of conjunction, disjunction and negation, has an event corresponding to it. Namely, it is the event E(α) =
{ω|ω(α) = T}. The converse is true as well. For any event E, there exists a proposition α, such that
E = E(α).
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6. (Extensionality) If Cn({A}) = Cn({B}), then K ∗ A = K ∗B.
7. (Superexpansion) K ∗ (A ∩ B) ⊆ Cn((K ∗ A) ∪ {B}).
8. (Subexpansion) If Bc /∈ K ∗ A, then Cn((K ∗ A) ∪ {B}) ⊆ K ∗ (A ∩ B).
The above axioms on the revision procedure have come be to known in the literature as the
AGM postulates. The Closure postulate says that the revised belief set K ∗ A is logically
closed. Success gaurantees that the information A is contained in K ∗ A. Inclusion means
that any event in the belief set K∗A is implied by K and A together. Vacuity means that if
the event A is consistent with K, then the revised set K ∗A contains all the consequences of
K and A. Consistency requires that K ∗A is consistent. In the current context with events,
Extensionality is trivially satisﬁed since Cn({A}) = Cn({B}) implies A = B. Finally, note
that the postulates Superexpansion and Subexpansion are similar to the postulates Inclusion
and Vacuity.
In their seminal paper, AGM (Alchourron et al. [1985]), establish that adherence to the
postulates is equivalent to following a two stage procedure for belief revision involving a con-
traction stage and expansion stage. The contraction step deletes events from K by selecting
from maximal subsets (according to set inclusion) of K consistent with A via a selection
function, and treats the intersection of the selected maximal subsets as the set of retained
events. The expansion stage adds A, by union, to the retained set of events from the con-
traction stage and treats the logical closure of the resultant set as the revised belief set K∗A.
For further details, see, for example, Costa and Pedersen [2011].
2.3.2 Incorporating AGM as a consistency requirement
We now deﬁne what it means for an updating rule to be AGM-consistent.
Deﬁnition 2.5. An updating rule < c,Π > is said to be AGM-consistent if there exist
revision operators {∗π}π∈Δ(Ω) (one for each prior π) satisfying the AGM postulates, such
that for all (π,A), we have that
Π(π,A) = {π′ : K(π′) = K(π) ∗π A}. (1)
The requirement is that the choice of posterior must be such that its support is consistent
with AGM belief revision i.e the posterior π′ should be such that the belief set corresponding
to it equals the belief set obtained by revising the belief set corresponding to the prior π based
on event A. Figure 1 depicts the requirement by means of a diagram. AGM consistency
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π K(π) A K(π) ∗π A
{π′ : K(π′) = K(π) ∗π A}
Figure 1: AGM-Consistency
requires the use of revision operators, which as mathematical objects, could be potentially
be very diﬃcult to handle. The following result, which follows from a theorem due to Grove
(see Theorems 1 and 2 in Grove [1988]), known as Grove’s representation theorem, allows a
simple characterisation of AGM-consistent updating rules involving complete and transitive
relations on the state space Ω.
Proposition 1. (Grove) An updating rule < c,Π > is AGM-consistent if and only if there
exists a family {≥π}π∈Δ(Ω) of complete and transitive relations on Ω such that for all π, we
have M≥π(Ω) = supp(π) and
Π(π,A) = {π′ : supp(π′) = M≥π(A)}, (2)
where M≥π(A) = {ω ∈ A : ω ≥π ω′ for all ω′ ∈ A} is the set of ≥π-greatest elements in A.
The diagram in Figure 2 explains the idea behind the above representation. The concen-
tric bands around supp(π) represent the equivalence classes of ≥π, in decreasing order, from
the inner to outer bands. When A is observed, we ﬁnd the highest equivalence class that
intersects with A. This intersection is equal to supp(π,A).
Finally, note that AGM consistency only places a restriction on the support of the poste-
rior. Moreover, the support depends on the sets K(π), A and the ordering ≥π. Here, note
that K(π) only depends on the support of π. However, apart from supp(π), the equivalence
classes of ≥π could potentially depend on the distribution of π. Hence, reactions to zero
probability events could potentially depend on the distribution of the prior.
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Asupp(π)
Figure 2: AGM consistency in terms of the ordering ≥π
3 Lexicographic Updating Rules
In this section, we study updating rules based on updating using lexicographic probability
systems. The main result is that an updating rule is lexicographic if and only if it is Bayesian,
AGM consistent and satisﬁes a weak form of path independence i.e the order in which infor-
mation arrives does not inﬂuence the ﬁnal posterior. Path independence is a key property
in the characterisation. We ﬁrst show that when a stronger version is imposed, there exist
no Bayesian updating rules which satisfy path independence (Claim 1). Propositions 2 and
3 correspond to the main result of this section.
3.1 Path Independence
A desirable property for an updating rule to have is path independence. This means that the
order in which information is received does not aﬀect the ﬁnal posterior. On positive prob-
ability events, indeed Bayesian updating rules satisfy this property of order independence.
We require that it be satisﬁed for all consistent pairs of events, including zero probability
events according to the prior. We deﬁne this formally.
Deﬁnition 3.1. An updating rule < c,Π > satisﬁes strong path independence if for all
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A,B ⊆ Ω such that A ∩ B 	= ∅ and for all π ∈ Δ(Ω) it is true that
c(c(π,A), B) = c(c(π,B), A).
We obtain the following result.
Claim 1. If |Ω| ≥ 3, then there exists no Bayesian updating rule which satisﬁes strong path
independence.
Proof. For any states ω ∈ Ω, let δω denote the Dirac-measure, which places probability one on
ω. Let < c,Π > be a Bayesian updating rule. Consider three distinct states {ω1, ω2, ω3} ⊆ Ω
and consider the prior δω1 . Now deﬁne the sets A = {ω1, ω2}, B = {ω1, ω3}, C = {ω2, ω3}.
Since < c,Π > is Bayesian, it is true that c(δω1 , A) = c(δω1 , B) = δω1 . Now deﬁne πˆ =
c(δω1 , C) = c(c(δω1 , A), C) = c(c(δω1 , B), C). Now by deﬁnition it is the case that supp(πˆ) ⊆
C = {ω2, ω3}. There are now three cases.
• Case 1 : supp(πˆ) = C = {ω2, ω3}. Now since < c,Π > is Bayesian, c(c(δω1 , C), B) =
δω3 . But, we have c(c(δω1 , B), C) = c(δω1 , C) = πˆ 	= δω3 .
• Case 2 : supp(πˆ) = {ω2}. This implies that πˆ = δω2 . Now, c(c(δω1 , C), B) =
c(δω2 , B). Note that supp(c(δω2 , B)) ⊆ B. So clearly c(δω2 , B) 	= δω2 . But we have
c(c(δω1 , B), C) = c(δω1 , C) = δω2 .
• Case 3 : supp(πˆ) = {ω3}. This implies that πˆ = δω3 . Now, c(c(δω1 , C), A) =
c(δω3 , A). Note that supp(c(δω3 , A)) ⊆ A. So clearly c(δω3 , A) 	= δω3 . But we have
c(c(δω1 , A), C) = c(δω1 , C) = δω3 .
The above result may be viewed as unsettling. Note that when restricted to positive
probability events, Bayesian updating satisﬁes path independence. However, when we ex-
pand the domain of updating to allow for zero probability events, path independence cannot
be satisﬁed. Note also that with two states of the world, the result does not apply. More-
over, with two states, one can verify that every Bayesian updating rule satisﬁes strong path
independence.
3.2 Lexicographic Updating Rules : Characterisation
In Blume et al. [1991a], updating via lexicographic probability systems (LPS) is deﬁned and
axiomatic foundations are studied for a model of decision making under uncertainty where
agents rank acts according to lexicographic expected utility. LPS’s provide a new class of
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updating rules where the posterior c(π,A) is provided by the Bayesian update of the ﬁrst
probability measure in a hierarchy < p1, ..., pK > with p1 = π, where A assumes a positive
probability i.e. pk(A) > 0. We now investigate the relationship between LPS’s and AGM-
consistent updating rules. First, we deﬁne formally what it means for an updating rule to
be lexicographic.
Deﬁnition 3.2. A lexicographic probability system (LPS) is a ﬁnite sequence p =< p1, ..., pK >
of probability measures on Ω such that for any non-empty event A ⊆ Ω, there exists an
1 ≤ i ≤ K such that pi(A) > 0. A lexicographic conditional probability system (LCPS) is an
LPS where the supports of the probability measures in < p1, ..., pK > are pairwise disjoint.
LPS’s can be used to deﬁne posteriors for all non-empty events in the following way. For
A ⊆ Ω non-empty, deﬁne the posterior to be p(.|A) := pk∗(.|A) where k∗ = min{k : pk(A) >
0}.
Claim 2. For every LPS p there exists an LCPS q such that for all non-empty A ⊆ Ω,
p(.|A) = q(.|A).
Proof. Let p =< p1, ..., pK > be an LPS. Deﬁne q as follows :
• Set q1 = p1.
• If Ω\ ∪ki=1 supp(qi) 	= ∅, then deﬁne qk+1 = pl(.|supp(pl)\ ∪ki=1 supp(qi)) where l =
min{j : supp(pj)\ ∪ki=1 supp(qi) 	= ∅}. If Ω\supp(qk) = ∅, then stop.
Since Ω is ﬁnite, this process terminates at some step K. Deﬁne q =< q1, ..., qK >. It can
now be shown that indeed p(.|A) = q(.|A) for all non-empty A ⊆ Ω 
It can also be shown that if two LCPS’s q and q′ induce the same conditional probabilities,
then q = q′. The implication of this is that for any LPS p there exists a unique LCPS q
which induces the conditional probabilities as p.
Deﬁnition 3.3. An updating rule < c,Π > is said to be lexicographic if there exists a family
{pπ}π∈Δ(Ω) of LPS’s such that :
• pπ1 = π for all π ∈ Δ(Ω).
• Π(π,A) = {π′ : supp(π′) = supp(pπ(.|A))}.
• c(π,A) = pπ(.|A).
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Let us now make some useful observations. Firstly, note that any family of LPS’s
{pπ}π∈Δ(Ω) yields an updating rule deﬁned by the conditions above. Secondly, suppose
for two families {pπ}π∈Δ(Ω) , {qπ}π∈Δ(Ω) we have that pπ(.|A) = qπ(.|A) for all non-empty
A ⊆ Ω and for all π ∈ Δ(Ω). Then, both families induce the same updating rule. Having
made these observations, we are now ready to prove our ﬁrst result.
Proposition 2. Every lexicographic updating rule < c,Π > is Bayesian and AGM-consistent.
Proof. Let < c,Π > be lexicographic with the corresponding family {pπ}π∈Δ(Ω). From the
above claim we can construct a family of LCPS’s {qπ}π∈Δ(Ω) such that pπ(.|A) = qπ(.|A)
for all non-empty A ⊆ Ω and for all π ∈ Δ. Hence {qπ}π∈Δ(Ω) the same updating rule.
Let π and A ⊆ Ω be such that π(A) > 0. Now Π(π,A) = {π′ : supp(π′) = supp(π) ∩ A}
and c(π,A) = pπ1 (.|A) = qπ1 (.|A) = π(.|A). So < c,Π > is Bayesian. We now show that it is
AGM-consistent. For π ∈ Δ(Ω), deﬁne the relation
ω ≥π ω′ ⇐⇒ ω ∈ supp(qπk ) and ω′ ∈ supp(qπl ) for k ≤ l.
Since the collection {supp(qπk )}k constitutes a partition of Ω, the order ≥π is complete and
transitive. Denote as Mk≥π(Ω), the set of all k-th highest states according to ≥π. Clearly,
Mk≥π(Ω) = supp(q
π
k ) for all k. Let k(π,A) = min{k : qπk (A) > 0}. From this observation we
get that Π(π,A) = {π′ : supp(π′) = supp(qπ(.|A))} = {π′ : supp(π′) = Mk(π,A)≥π (Ω) ∩ A =
M≥π(A)}. Hence, from Proposition 1, it follows that < c,Π > is AGM-consistent.
We have established that every lexicographic updating rule is Bayesian and AGM-consistent.
However, there exist Bayesian and AGM-consistent updating rules which are not lexico-
graphic (see Example 3.1). One natural question to address at this point would be : under
what additional conditions are Bayesian, AGM-consistent updating rules lexicographic? It
turns out that the only additional condition we need is a weak form of path independence.
We ﬁrst deﬁne path independence and then derive our result.
Deﬁnition 3.4. An updating rule < c,Π > satisﬁes weak path independence if for all π ∈
Δ(Ω) and for all A,B ⊆ Ω such that suppΠ(π,A) ∩ suppΠ(π,B) 	= ∅, it is true that
c(c(π,A), B) = c(c(π,B), A).
Some remarks about weak path independence are in order. Note by deﬁnition, we have
suppΠ(π,A) ⊆ A and suppΠ(π,B) ⊆ B. Hence, indeed weak path independence is a
weaker notion compared to strong path independence. Moreover, if an updating rule is
AGM consistent, then it is true that for all π ∈ Δ(Ω) and for all A,B ⊆ Ω such that
suppΠ(π,A) ∩ suppΠ(π,B) 	= ∅, supp(c(c(π,A), B)) = supp(c(c(π,B), A)). This is because
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if the support of the posteriors under A and B intersect, then A and B both must be inter-
secting with the same equivalence class of ≥π.
It can be shown that lexicographic updating rules satisfy weak path independence. Sup-
pose {qπ} is the associated family of LPS’s. Since suppΠ(π,A)∩ suppΠ(π,B) 	= ∅, it follows
that supp(qπ(.|A)) ∩ supp(qπ(.|B)) 	= ∅. Hence, we have min{k : qπk (A) > 0} = min{k :
qπk (B) > 0} =: k∗. Morever, A ∩ B ∩ supp(qπk∗) 	= ∅. This means that A ∩ B is a positive
probability event under qπk∗ . Then, by Bayes’ rule applied to the probability measure q
π
k∗
and events A and B, we get that c(c(π,A), B) = qπk∗(.|A ∩ B) = c(c(π,B), A). Hence, the
updating rules satisﬁes weak path independence. We now prove the main result.
Proposition 3. Let < c,Π > be an updating rule which is Bayesian, AGM-consistent and
satisﬁes weak path independence. Then < c,Π > is lexicographic.
Proof. We wish to deﬁne a family {qπ}π∈Δ(Ω) of LPS’s. We do this as follows. Let π ∈ Δ(Ω).
Since < c,Π > is AGM-consistent, there exists a complete transitive relation ≥π on Ω which
determines Π(π, .). Now deﬁne qπ in the following way :
Set qπk = c(π,M
k
≥π(Ω)) for all k. (3)
Here, recall that Mk≥π(Ω) is the set of all k-th highest states (equivalence class) according
to ≥π. Deﬁne qπ =< qπk >k. Note that the support of qπk is Mk≥π(Ω). This is true since c is
AGM-consistent. The support of c(π,A) is precisely M≥π(A), which is the set of all maximal
elements of A according to ≥π. But now note that M≥π(Mk≥π(Ω)) = Mk≥π(Ω), since all states
in the equivalence class Mk≥π(Ω) are equally ranked according to ≥π. Hence, the support of
qπk is M
k
≥π(Ω) from the deﬁnition of q
π
k in 3.
Now let A ⊆ Ω be non-empty. Let k(π,A) = min{k : qπk (A) > 0}. So now we get
that M≥π(A) = M
k(π,A)
≥π (Ω) ∩ A = supp(qπk(π,A)) ∩ A = supp(qπ(.|A)). Hence, we get










where 4 and 6 follow from the fact that < c,Π > is Bayesian and 5 follows from weak path
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independence. Hence, we have shown that < c,Π > is lexicographic.
Combining the results above we obtain the following.
Corollary 4. An updating rule is Bayesian, AGM-consistent and satisﬁes weak path inde-
pendence if and only if it is lexicographic.
We now show that the properties ”AGM-consistency”, ”Bayesian” and ”Weak path inde-
pendence” are independent from each other i.e. there exist updating rules which satisfy two
of the properties but not the third. For convenience, let us call them AGM, BA and WPI
respectively. We demonstrate the independence of the three properties via the following
examples.
Example 3.1. (AGM, BA but not WPI ) Let Ω = {x, y, z, w} and let < c,Π > be any
Bayesian updating rule such that Π(π,A) = {π′|supp(π′) = A} whenever π(A) = 0. One can
verify that this is AGM-consistent. For each π, deﬁne≥π as a complete and transitive relation
with two equivalence classes, namely supp(π) and its complement, where the former is ranked
higher than the latter. Now suppose, c(δx, {y, z}) = 1/2(y) + 1/2(z) = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0) and
c(δx, {y, z, w}) = 1/2(y) + (1/4)(z) + 1/4(w). Now let π = δx, A = {y, z}, B = {y, z, w}.
Then, c(c(π,A), B) = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0) but c(c(π,B), A) = (0, 2/3, 1/3, 0), violating weak path
independence. From Proposition 3, this also serves as an example of a Bayesian and AGM-
consistent updating rule that is not lexicographic.
Example 3.2. (AGM, WPI but not BA) Let Ω = {x, y, z} and let < c,Π > be an updating
rule which always picks the posterior which has uniform distribution on the event observed A.
Since we are always updating to a uniform distribution, weak path independence is trivially
satisﬁed. AGM consistency is also satisﬁed as in the previous example. Note however, that
such an updating rule cannot be Bayesian since for π = (1/2, 1/3, 1/6), and A = {x, y}, we
get c(π,A) = (1/2, 1/2, 0) which is not the Bayesian posterior.
Example 3.3. (WPI,BA but not AGM ) Let < c,Π > be any Bayesian updating rule such
that suppΠ(π,A) is a singleton whenever π(A) = 0, meaning that c(π,A) is a delta measure.
We can show that such rules always satisfy weak path independence. Let π ∈ Δ(Ω) and
A,B ⊆ Ω such that suppΠ(π,A) ∩ suppΠ(π,B) 	= ∅.
• Case 1: W.l.o.g suppose π(A) > 0. Then ∅ 	= suppΠ(π,A)∩ suppΠ(π,B) = supp(π)∩
A ∩ suppΠ(π,B) ⊆ supp(π) ∩ A ∩ B ⊆ A ∩ B. This implies that π(A ∩ B) > 0.
Since < c,Π > is Bayesian, we have c(c(π,A), B) = c(c(π,B), A) because restricted to
positive probability events, Bayes’ rule gaurantees path independence.
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• Case 2 : π(A) = 0 and π(B) = 0. By assumption, ∅ 	= suppΠ(π,A) ∩ suppΠ(π,B) =
suppΠ(π,A) = suppΠ(π,B) = {ω}, for some ω ∈ A ∩ B. Hence, c(π,A) = c(π,B) =
δω. Since < c,Π > is Bayesian, c(c(π,A), B) = c(c(π,B), A) = δω.
Now, let Ω = {x, y, z, w} and consider any such rule < c,Π > which satisﬁes c(δx, {y, z, w}) =
δy and c(δx, {y, z}) = δz. Such rules exist because the only restriction here for the case
π(A) = 0 is that the support of c(π,A) is a singleton. Suppose for contradiction that
< c,Π > is AGM-consistent and let {≥π}π be the associated family of complete and transitive
orderings. Since, c(δx, {y, z, w}) = δy, we must have that y ≥δx z and ¬z ≥δx y. However,
on the other hand, since c(δx, {y, z}) = δz, we must have z ≥δx y, which is a contradiction.
4 Minimum Distance Updating Rules
We now study minimum distance updating rules. Such updating rules select posteriors in
Π(π,A) which are ”closest” to the prior.
Deﬁnition 4.1. An updating rule < c,Π > is said to be minimum distance if there exists
a metric d on Δ(Ω) such that {c(π,A)} = arg min
π′∈Π(π,A)
d(π, π′).
Minimum distance updating rules capture the idea of conservatism in belief updating, in
the sense that new information keeps updated beliefs as close to the prior belief as is possible.
Not all Bayesian updating rules have a minimum distance representation. However, certain
restrictions on the AGM procedure allow Bayesian updating rules to be minimum distance.
We explore the connection between lexicographic and minimum distance updating rules.
We show that a sub-class of lexicographic updating rules, which we call ”support depen-
dent” updating rules necessarily have a minimum distance representation. Additionally, we
demonstrate an example of a lexicographic updating rule outside this class which has no
minimum distance representation.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A lexicographic updating rule < c,Π > is support dependent if the family
of lexicographic updating rules {pπ}π generating it satisﬁes :
For all π, π′ ∈ Δ(Ω), supp(π) = supp(π′) implies pπ\{π} = pπ′\{π′}
The above condition is interpreted as follows : If two decision makers have priors with
the same support, then they use the same secondary hypotheses to update when they re-
ceive surprising information. The next result shows that support dependent lexicographic
updating rules have a minimum distance representation.
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Proposition 5. Every support dependent lexicographic updating rule has a minimum dis-
tance representation.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix and involves two main steps. We provide
here an outline of the proof. In the ﬁrst step, we construct a metric d that gaurantees that
c(π,A) is the unique solution to minπ′∈Π(π,A) d(π, π′) whenever π(A) > 0. Hence, essentially d
gaurantees a minimum distance representation of Bayesian updating on positive probability
events. In the second step, we use d to construct a metric dL which provides a minimum
distance representation of < c,Π >. For any π, π′, the quantity dL(π, π′) is deﬁned as a
translation of the sum of the distances d(pπl , π
′) and d(π, pπ
′
k ) where l is the smallest integer
so that supp(pπl )∩supp(π′) 	= ∅ and k is the smallest integer so that supp(pπ′k )∩supp(π) 	= ∅.
This covers the case π(A) = 0.
The following is an example of a lexicographic updating rule that is not support dependent
and admits no minimum distance representation.
Example 4.1. Let Ω = {x, y, z, w}. A typical probability vector in Δ(Ω) will be denoted as
π = (πx, πy, πz, πw). For each A ⊆ Ω, we denote πuA ∈ Δ(Ω) to be the uniform distribution




< (p, 1− p, 0, 0), (0, 0, p, 1− p) > if π = (p, 1− p, 0, 0)
< (0, 0, p, 1− p), (1− p, p, 0, 0) > if π = (0, 0, p, 1− p)
< π, πusupp(π)c > o.w.
Note that pπ is not support dependent. Suppose for contradiction that the lexicographic
updating rule generated by the family {pπ}π has a minimum distance representation. Let d
be the associated metric.
Let A = {x, y} and B = {z, w}. Firstly, note that c((1/4, 3/4, 0, 0), B) = (0, 0, 1/4, 3/4) ;
c((0, 0, 1/4, 3/4), A) = (3/4, 1/4, 0, 0) ; c((3/4, 1/4, 0, 0), B) = (0, 0, 3/4, 1/4) ; c((0, 0, 3/4, 1/4), A) =
(1/4, 3/4, 0, 0). Hence, starting with prior (1/4, 3/4, 0, 0) and alternating events B and A we
obtain a cycle back to (1/4, 3/4, 0, 0). Since c(π,A) is the unique minimiser of distance, we
get the following chain of strict inequalities
d(((1/4, 3/4, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1/4, 3/4)) < d(((1/4, 3/4, 0, 0), (0, 0, 3/4, 1/4))
< d(((3/4, 1/4, 0, 0), (0, 0, 3/4, 1/4))
< d(((3/4, 1/4, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1/4, 3/4))
< d(((1/4, 3/4, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1/4, 3/4)).
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This results in a contradiction. Hence, the updating rule corresponding to {pπ}π has no
minimum distance representation.
It is interesting to compare the present setting involving minimum distance updating
rules with Perea [2009]. In that paper, updating of π based on E involves choosing the
minimiser of the euclidean distance ||φ(π) − φ(π′)|| over π′ ∈ Δ(E), where φ is an aﬃne
map and Δ(E) is the set of all probability measures that have support in E. The approach
of the paper is related to the present paper though the notions of minimum distance and
the nature of updating is very diﬀerent. For example, Perea [2009] is motivated by the idea
of imaging and non-Bayesian updating. Also, the updating rules need not be AGM consis-
tent. Lastly, Rubinstein and Zhou [1999] also discuss choice problems where alternatives are
chosen according to the minimum distance rule. One may view the present work as being
complementary to these papers.
5 Updating Preferences
It is possible to undertake a similar approach to the problem of updating preferences (see for
example Gilboa and Schmeidler [1993] and Hanany and Klibanoﬀ [2007]). Let Ω be the state
space as before and let X denote a ﬁnite set of outcomes. An act is a map f : Ω → Δ(X)
and let F denote the set of all acts. A preference relation , is any complete and transitive
relation on F . We let P denote any collection of preferences.
An updating rule in this context is deﬁned as follows. The agent starts with a prior preference
 and then upon observing A, updates his preference to ′. Formally, an updating rule is
deﬁned analogously as a tuple < c,Π >, where c : P×2Ω\{∅} → P and Π : P×2Ω\{∅} → 2P .
As before, the idea is that when the preference is  and the event observed is A, then the
agent ﬁrst narrows down a menu of possible preferences Π(, A), which corresponds to the
qualitative part of updating, possibly involving identifying a set of core beliefs (belief sets
below). Next, the choice c(, A) corresponds to the quantitative part of updating, which
involves the precise pairwise comparisons of various acts, depending on the lotteries over
outcomes that would yield at each of the states.
In this context, one may deﬁne belief sets corresponding to preferences. Firstly, we de-
ﬁne conditional preferences in the sense of Savage. For any A, we say f A g if fAh  gAh
for all h (see Savage [1954]). Here, for two acts f and h and an event A, the act fAh is de-
ﬁned as the act that agrees with f on A and agrees with h on Ac. If the preference relation
19
 satisﬁes the Independence axiom4, it is straightforward to show that the relation E is
complete, transitive and also satisﬁes the Independence axiom. For each preference , we
say an event E is -savage-null if fEh ∼ gEh for all h.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A belief set corresponding to a preference relation  is deﬁned as the set
of events
K() = {E : Ec is -savage-null}. (7)
Hence, a -savage-null event corresponds to a set of states that are essentially disregarded
in the agent’s preference. It is straightforward to show that K() is always logically closed.
This follows from the fact that the union of two -savage-null events is also -savage-null
and the fact that subsets of -savage-null events are also -savage-null. Note that when E is
-savage-null, then the relation E is trivial i.e. f ∼E g for all f and g. Also, when A is such
that ∩E∈K()E ∩A 	= ∅, we have that ∩E∈K(A)E = ∩E∈K()E ∩A. It shall be convenient to
deﬁne the set B() =
⋂
E∈K()E for ∈ P , corresponds to the ”core” of the belief set K().
We will require that updating rules satisfy the condition that B(′) = B(′′) ⊆ A for
all ′,′′∈ Π(, A) i.e. the belief set corresponding to the updated preferences contains the
arrived information A. The common support, as before, will be denoted as suppΠ(, A). We
say an updating rule is savage-consistent if c(, A) =A whenever B()∩A 	= ∅ i.e. when-
ever A is consistent with the belief set K(). An updating rule is said to be AGM-consistent
if there exists a family of revision operators {∗}∈P such that
Π(, A) = {′∈ P : K(′) = K() ∗ A}. (8)
The notions of strong and weak path independence arise analogously. An updating rule sat-
isﬁes strong path independence if for all A∩B 	= ∅, we have c(c(, A), B) = c(c(, B), A). It
satisﬁes weak path independence if c(c(, A), B) = c(c(, B), A) is required to hold whenever
suppΠ(, A) ∩ suppΠ(, B) 	= ∅.
In line with Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we obtain here a characterisation of lexi-
cographic updating rules, which are deﬁned as follows. A lexicographic preference proﬁle is
a ﬁnite sequence of preference relations P =< P1, ...., PK >
5 such that ∪kB(Pk) = Ω and
B(Pk) ∩ B(Pl) = ∅ for all k 	= l. An updating rule < c,Π > is said to be lexicographic if
4The Independence axiom states that for all f, g, h and for all λ ∈ (0, 1), it holds that f  g if and only
if λf + (1− λ)h  λg + (1− λ)h.
5We adopt the notation Pk to diﬀerentiate it with the prior preference .
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there exists a family a lexicographic preference proﬁles {P}∈P such that = P1 and
c(, A) = Pk,E, (9)
where k = min{l : B(Pl ) ∩ A 	= ∅} and Pk,E is the savage conditional preference based on
the event E. The following holds in this context.
Proposition 6. Let P be a class of preference relations which satisfy the independence
axiom. Suppose that for each ∈ P, it holds that A∈ P whenever B()∩A 	= ∅. Further,
suppose that B() 	= ∅ for each ∈ P and that for each non-empty A, there exists ∈ P
such that B() = A. Then, the following hold.
1. If |Ω| ≥ 3, there does not exist any updating rule that is both Savage-consistent and
satisﬁes strong path independence.
2. An updating rule is Savage-consistent, AGM-consistent and satisﬁes weak path inde-
pendence if and only if it is lexicographic.
Minimum distance rules may be deﬁned in the same manner as in Section 4. This would
involve deﬁning a metric over preference relations, d(,′). The updating rule would have
c(π,A) be the unique solution to the problem min′∈Π(,A) d(,′). It could potentially be
useful to study such updating rules and its properties as an extension of the present work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of updating over zero probability events. Our analysis is
centered around the relationship between the problem of theory change in the belief revision
literature in propositional logic and updating probabilistic beliefs about events based on
evidence. In particular, we studied lexicographic and minimum-distance updating rules and
their relationship with AGM consistent updating rules. As noted earlier in the introduction,
there have been alternative approaches to this problem and one may also consider extensions
of our analysis. One extension, as indicated in the introduced, would be to study implications
of our approach to updating ambiguous beliefs. Another line of extension would be to
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Step 1 :
We deﬁne the metric d on Δ(Ω). First, for any pair of states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, we deﬁne the
function Sωω′ : Δ(Ω)×Δ(Ω) → R+ as follows :
• If π 	= π′ and min{π({ω, ω′}), π′({ω, ω′})} > 0 :
Sωω′(π, π




• If π 	= π′ and min{π({ω, ω′}), π′({ω, ω′})} = 0 :
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Sωω′(π, π
′) = c where c ≥ 1.
• If π = π′ then :
Sωω′(π, π
′) = 0.
Notice that for any pair ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, Sωω′(π, π′) = Sω′ω(π, π′). Also, it can easily be shown that
Sωω′ deﬁnes a pseudometric on Δ(Ω) and that for any π 	= π′, there exist states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω
such that Sωω′(π, π







The above metric is indeed exactly the one we need. So we shall now show that for any
A ⊆ Ω such that π(A) > 0, we have c(π,A) = {πB(π,A)} = arg min
π′∈Π(π,A)
d(π, π′). Here,
πB(π,A) denotes the Bayesian update of π based on A. Now, note if supp(π) ∩ A = {ω},
then Π(π,A) = {δω}, so clearly {πB(π,A)} = {δω} = arg min
π′∈Π(π,A)
d(π, π′). So we only
consider the case when |supp(π) ∩ A| ≥ 2.
• Case 1 : π ∈ Π(π,A) :
Notice in this case, supp(π) = supp(π)∩A, hence π(A) = 1. So we have π = πB(π,A).
Now clearly, d(π, πB(π,A)) = 0. Now consider π
′ ∈ Π(π,A)\{πB(π,A)}. Since π 	=
πB(π,A) = π, there exists a pair of states ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω such that Sω1ω2(π, π′) > 0. Hence
d(π, π′) > 0 and we get {πB(π,A)} = arg min
π′∈Π(π,A)
d(π, π′).
• Case 2 : π /∈ Π(π,A) :
Now partition pairs of states in the following way :
– So = {(ω, ω′) : ω ∈ supp(π) ∩ A but ω′ /∈ supp(π) ∩ A}.
– S− = {(ω, ω′) : {ω, ω′} ⊆ [supp(π) ∩ A]c and ω 	= ω′}.
– S+ = {(ω, ω′) : {ω, ω′} ⊆ supp(π) ∩ A and ω 	= ω′}.
1. Consider (ω, ω′) ∈ So. Since ω ∈ supp(π)∩A, π({ω, ω′}) > 0 and π′({ω, ω′}) > 0
for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A). Hence, min{π{ω, ω′}, π′{ω, ω′}} > 0 and π 	= π′ for all
π′ ∈ Π(π,A) (since π /∈ Π(π,A)). Hence :
Sωω′(π, π
′) = | π(w)
π{ω,ω′} − π
′(w)
π′{ω,ω′} | = | π(w)π{ω,ω′} − 1| for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A).
So Sωω′(π, π









for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A)\{πB(π,A)}.
2. Consider (ω, ω′) ∈ S−. Then clearly π′({ω, ω′}) = 0 and π 	= π′ for all π′ ∈
Π(π,A). Hence, Sωω′(π, π







′) for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A)\{πB(π,A)}.
3. Consider (ω, ω′) ∈ S+. Then clearly π({ω, ω′}) > 0 and π′({ω, ω′}) > 0 for all
π′ ∈ Π(π,A). Hence, min{π{ω, ω′}, π′{ω, ω′}} > 0 and π 	= π′ for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A).









we get Sω,ω′(π, πB(π,A)) = 0 for all (ω, ω
′) ∈ S+
Now consider π′ ∈ Π(π,A)\{πB(π,A)}. Now there exist states ω, ω′ ∈ E ∗ (π)∩A
such that Sω,ω′(π, π
′) > 0.







′) for all π′ ∈
Π(π,A)\{πB(π,A)}.







′) = d(π, π′) for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A)\{πB(π,A)}. Hence, we obtain our desired




Let < c,Π > be a support dependent lexicographic updating rule and let {pπ}π be the
family generating it. Consider the metric d constructed in Step 1. Now we deﬁne a function
dˆ : Δ(Ω)×Δ(Ω) → R+ as follows :
1. For π = π′, set dˆ(π, π′) = 0.
2. For π 	= π′, let pπ = {pπk}k and pπ′ = {pπ′l }l deﬁne the natural number K(π, π′) as :
K(π, π′) := min{l : supp(pπl ) ∩ supp(π′) 	= ∅}
And now deﬁne :
dˆ(π, π′) = d(pπK(π,π′), π
′).
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The interpretation of dˆ is as follows. Given the LPS pπ = (pπk)k corresponding to π, we
consider at the smallest l such that supp(pπl ) ∩ supp(π′) 	= ∅ i.e. such that π′ is consistent
with pπ. Hence, in a sense, the function dˆ(π, π′) measures the ”divergence” between π and
π′ in terms of the LPS pπ and in particular, the secondary hypotheses in pπ are applied for
the case when supp(π)∩ supp(π′) = ∅. Note further that in the case supp(π)∩ supp(π′) = ∅,
we would have that d(π, π′) = c from the construction of d in Step 1 above. Also, in the case
when supp(π)∩ supp(π′) 	= ∅, it follows that d(π, π′) = dˆ(π, π′). Hence, the function dˆ(π, π′)
distinguishes between π and π′ more ”ﬁnely” compared to d.
The function dˆ(π, π′) will now be used to deﬁne our the desired metric dL. Note dˆ(π, π′)
itself may not be symmetric or satisfy the triangular inequality. We proceed as follows.
First, we deﬁne the function Sˆ(π, π′) = dˆ(π, π′) + dˆ(π′, π). Note now that Sˆ is symmetric
and 0 < supπ,π′ Sˆ(π, π
′) < +∞ but may not satisfy triangular inequality. Now, let M > 0
be a real number such that supπ,π′ Sˆ(π, π
′) < M . Finally, deﬁne the desired metric dL as
follows :
1. For π = π′, set dL(π, π′) = 0.
2. For π 	= π′, set dL(π, π′) = Sˆ(π, π′) +M .
It can be checked that dL satisﬁes the axioms of a metric and is essentially a translation of
Sˆ so as to satisfy the triangular inequality.
We now show that the above metric dL generates < c,Π >. Note that since M is a
constant, the solutions to the minimisation problem minπ′∈Π(π,A) dL(π, π′) and the prob-
lem minπ′∈Π(π,A) Sˆ(π, π′) are exactly the same. Hence, we will show that the unique solution
is equal to c(π,A).
Let π ∈ Δ(Ω) and A ∈ 2Ω\{∅} and deﬁne k(π,A) = min{k : pπk(A) > 0}. Also, recall
that Π(π,A) = {π′ : supp(π′) = supp(pπk) ∩ A}. There are two cases.
1. Suppose ﬁrst that π(A) > 0. Then, dL(π, π
′) = 2d(π, π′) + M for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A).
From Step 1, we indeed have that c(π,A), which is the Bayesian update of π based
on A, is the unique solution to the minimisation problem minπ′∈Π(π,A) d(π, π′). This in
turn implies that c(π,A) is also the unique solution to minπ′∈Π(π,A) dL(π, π′).
2. Now suppose that π(A) = 0. Note that this means that k(π,A) ≥ 2. Recall all prob-
ability measures in Π(π,A) have the same support, which in this case is disjoint from
the support of π. Hence, from support dependence of the updating rule < c,Π >, we
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have that dˆ(π′, π) = dˆ(π′′, π) for all π′, π′′ ∈ Π(π,A). This follows directly from the
deﬁnition of dˆ.
Also from the deﬁnition of dˆ in terms of d and from Step 1, we have that dˆ(π, π′) =
d(pπk(π,A), π
′) > d(pπk(π,A), p
π
k(π,A)(.|A)) = dˆ(π, c(π,A)) for all π′ 	= c(π,A) in Π(π,A).
Note we have also used the fact that c(π,A) = pπk(π,A)(.|A).
Combining these two, we obtain
dL(π, π
′) = Sˆ(π, π′) +M
= dˆ(π, π′) + dˆ(π′, π) +M
> dˆ(π, c(π,A)) + dˆ(c(π,A), π) +M
= dL(π, c(π,A))
for all π′ ∈ Π(π,A)\{c(π,A)}. Hence, we have shown that c(π,A) is the unique solution
to minπ′∈Π(π,A) dL(π, π′).
7.2 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof follows along lines similar to Claim 1 and Propositions 2 and 3. The satisfaction
of the Independence axiom is needed only to gaurantee that A is well-deﬁned whenever
B() ∩ A 	= ∅.
Proof of Part 1 : We show the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Since |Ω| ≥ 3, there exist dis-
tinct x, y, z in Ω. Now, let ∈ P be such that B() = {x}. Now, let A′ = {x, y}, B′ = {y, z}
amd C ′ = {z, x}. Let ′= c(, B′). Now by requirement, we must have B(′) ⊆ {y, z}.
First note if B(′) = {x, y}, then c((, B′), A′) will equal the savage conditional prefer-
ence of c(, B′) based on A′. Hence, B(c((, B′), A′) = {y}. On the other hand, note that
A′c is -savage-null, hence A′ ∈ K(). In this case, it follows that c(, A′), which is the
savage conditional preference of  based on A′, is unchanged and equals . But this means
that B(c((, A′), B′)) = B(c(, B′)) = B(′) = {x, y}. This violates strong path indepen-
dence.
Now suppose that B(′) is a singleton. W.l.o.g. assume that B(′) = {y}. In this case, we
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get B(c((, C ′), A′)) = B(c(, A′)) = {y}. However, it must be the case, by requirement,
that B(c((, A′), C ′)) ⊆ {z, x}. This is again a violation of strong path independence.
Proof of Part 2 : It is straighforward to verify that every lexicographic updating rule
satisﬁes Savage-consistency, AGM-consistency and weak path independence. We argue the
”only if” direction. Suppose < c,Π > satisﬁes Savage-consistency, AGM-consistency and
weak path independence. Let ∈ P . Since the updating rule is AGM-consistent, there
is a complete transitive ordering ≥ corresponding to . Now, deﬁne the lexicographic
preference proﬁle P as
Pk = c(,Mk≥(Ω)) (10)
where Mk≥(Ω) is the set k-th highest elements in Ω according to the ordering ≥. We show
that the family of lexicographic preference proﬁles {P}∈P indeed generates < c,Π >.
Let A be non-empty. Let l be the smallest integer so that A ∩ M l≥(Ω) 	= ∅. Hence,
since < c,Π > is AGM-consistent, we have that B(c(, A)) = A ∩ M l≥(Ω). This implies
that suppΠ(, A) ∩ suppΠ(,M l≥(Ω)) 	= ∅. Now, note that since Savage-consistency is
satisﬁed, c(c(, A),M l≥(Ω)) is the savage conditional preference of c(, A) based on event
M l≥(Ω)). But since B(c(, A)) ⊆ M l≥(Ω), we have that c(c(, A),M l≥(Ω)) = c(, A).
Now consider c(c(,M l≥(Ω)), A), which is simply the savage conditional preference of
c(,M l≥(Ω)) based on A. However, from 10, this is equal to P

l,A, which is the savage
conditional preference of Pl based on A. Finally, from weak path independence, it follows
that c(, A) = Pl,A.
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